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，大陆地区私营企业中 75%以上属家族企业， 大的 15
家家族上市企业总值占国内生产总值之比约 20%。 




































Family business is one of the most popular kinds of enterprise forms 
in the world, it is considered to be biggest in quantities and complex 
in its internal structure among groups of contemporary enterprises as well. 
More than 40% of enterprises in top 500 of the world are family business, 
including Microsoft, Kodak, Ford and so on. In China, family business is 
a common form in enterprises. According to investigation, 75% of private 
enterprises are family business in mainland of China，the total value of 
top 15 accounts for 20% of GDP approximately. 
Since 1990s, Chinese family business has been growing up quickly, a 
group of excellent companies issue stocks in A Share Market publicly, 
which played an important role in the national economy and the market 
economy. In 2004, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Board established, 
which provides a good platform for the further development of family 
business. From then on, it is focused by theoretical and practical 
researchers. The subjects of family business, such as corporate 
governance, financing method, ownership structure are researched by many 
scholars. 
In order to be better and stronger, family business must pay more 
attention to promoting enterprise value, which depends on the efficiency 
of corporate governance, its inner basis is ownership structure. 
Generally speaking, corporate governance depends on ownership structure, 
which determine configuration of enterprise ownership and operating mode 
of governance, then influence the efficiency of corporate governance. 
Therefore, special ownership structure of family business, influence 
















Consider for the fact that most family business are small & medium 
enterprises, the thesis will select data from SME Board in 2004,2005 and 
2006, define equity constituent, ownership concentration and ownership 
control as variables of  ownership structure，process an empirical 
research on ownership structure and value, which indicate as EVA return. 
The main conclusions are as follows: as far as equity constituent，
proportion of legal person shares and company value present the positive 
related relation，proportion of circulating and company value present the 
negative related relation；as far as ownership concentration，there is 
the not-significant reverse U-style relationship between the proportion 
of the first largest shareholder and value, Herfindahl Index and company 
value present the negative related relation；Ownership control and company 
value present the negative related relation. Finally, according to 
empirical result, the article put forward some suggestions, in order to 
provide some guidance for the adjustment of family business corporate 
governance. 
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第 1 章 导论 
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代企业群体中数量 为庞大、内部结构 为复杂、规模差异 为显著和生存性质
为独特的一种企业形态。世界 500 强企业中有 40%由家族所有或经营，包括微
软、柯达、福特等。在我国，家族企业这种组织形式更是非常普遍，据调查显示
[1]
，大陆地区私营企业中 75%以上属家族企业， 大的 15 家家族上市企业总值占
国内生产总值的比例约为 20%。  





















































































































国外关于股权结构对企业价值影响的研究起步较早，从Berle & Means(1932) 
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